Abstract. We present new techniques for achieving adaptive security in broadcast encryption systems. Previous work on fully collusion resistant broadcast encryption systems with very short ciphertexts was limited to considering only static security. First, we present a new definition of security that we call semi-static security and show a generic "two-key" transformation from semi-statically secure systems to adaptively secure systems that have comparable-size ciphertexts. Using bilinear maps, we then construct broadcast encryption systems that are semi-statically secure in the standard model and have constant-size ciphertexts. Our semi-static constructions work when the number of indices or identifiers in the system is polynomial in the security parameter. For identity-based broadcast encryption, where the number of potential indices or identifiers may be exponential, we present the first adaptively secure system with sublinear ciphertexts. We prove security in the standard model.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption systems [17] allow a sender, who wants to send a message to a dynamically chosen subset S ⊆ [1, n] of users, to construct a ciphertext such that only users in S can decrypt; the sender can then safely transmit this ciphertext over a broadcast channel to all users. It is preferable if the system is public key (anybody can encrypt), permits stateless receivers (users do not need to update their private keys), and is fully collusion resistant (even if all users outside of S collude, they cannot decrypt). Typically in this paper, when we speak of a broadcast encryption system, we will assume that it has these properties. The main challenge in building efficient broadcast systems is to encrypt messages with short ciphertexts.
Traditionally, broadcast encryption systems have relied on combinatorial techniques. Such systems include a collusion bound t, where using larger values of t impacts system performance. If an adversary compromises more than t keys, the system would no longer guarantee security even for encryptions solely to uncompromised users. Among systems that are fully collusion resistant, the ciphertext typically grows linearly with either the number of privileged receivers (in the broadcast subset) or the number of revoked users [22, 15, 20, 19, 24] . Recently, Boneh, Gentry, and Waters [8] broke through this barrier. They presented new methods for achieving fully collusion resistant systems with short (i.e., O(λ), where λ is the security parameter) ciphertexts by applying computational techniques using groups with bilinear maps. However, they used a static model of security in which an adversary declares the target set S * of his challenge ciphertext before even seeing the system parameters.
Unfortunately, the weaker static model of security does not capture the power of several types of attackers. Attackers might choose which keys to attempt to compromise and ciphertexts to attack based on the system parameters or the structure of previously compromised keys. To capture general attackers we must use an adaptive definition of security.
Adaptive Security We would like to achieve a system that is provably fully collusion resistant under adaptive attacks. Arguably, this is the "right" model for security in broadcast encryption systems.
Achieving this goal, however, seems challenging. In a security reduction, intuitively, we would expect that a simulation must know all the private keys requested by the attacker, but not know any of the private keys for S * , the set encrypted to in the challenge ciphertext. Once the public parameters are published, the simulator is essentially bound to what keys it knows. Therefore, in the adaptive setting it might appear that the best we can do in a reduction is to simply guess what keys the adversary might request. Unfortunately, for a system with n users a reduction might guess correctly only a negligible (in n) fraction of the time.
One approach for achieving adaptive security is to apply a hybrid argument. Instead of doing a reduction in one step, one can break the reduction into n + 1 hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H n , such that hybrid games H i and H i+1 are indistinguishable to the adversary. In this reduction in Hybrid H i the challenge ciphertext is to set S * \ [1, i] , where S * is the challenge specified by the adversary. Since each reduction in the hybrid games lops off only one user at a time, the reduction needs only to guess whether user i+1 will be in S * when distinguishing between H i and H i+1 , thus avoiding an exponential drop-off.
The key leverage that this solution needs is the ability to reduce the target set anonymously. This can be done with O(λ · |S|) size ciphertexts. Recently, Boneh and Waters [10] achieved O(λ · √ n) size ciphertexts. They combine the BGW broadcast techniques with the private linear broadcast techniques of Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [9] (that were originally designed for building traitor tracing techniques). Unfortunately, the √ n factor seems to be inherent in this approach with groups that have bilinear (as opposed to say trilinear) maps.
Our Methods First, we introduce a new general technique for proving systems adaptively secure. The first component of our methodology is the introduction of the semi-static model of security. In the semi-static model of security an attacker must first commit to a setS before setup, but then can later attack any set S * that is a subset ofS. This gives the attacker more flexibility than the static model, in which it had to exactly commit to the set it attacks.
At first glance the semi-static model might appear as simply a minor variant of the static model. However, we will also show a generic transformation from semi-static security to adaptive security. Suppose a ciphertext in the semi-static scheme was of size C for a set S of users; then in our transformation the ciphertexts will be of size 2 · C plus |S| bits. At the heart of our transformation is a two-key technique where two keys are assigned to each user, but the user is given only one of them. We note that our techniques are partially inspired from those used by Katz and Wang [21] to achieve tight security for IBE systems in the random oracle model.
Using this transformation we might simply hope to prove the BGW system to be semi-statically secure. Unfortunately, the BGW proof of security requires an "exact cancellation" and there is not an obvious way to prove BGW to be semi-statically secure. Instead, we provide two new constructions with constantsize ciphertexts, and prove semi-static security in the standard model. The first construction is a variant of the BGW that still has short ciphertexts, but that requires longer-size private keys. Like the BGW encryption system, we prove our security under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assumption.
Our first construction has two principal limitations. First, it has long private keys. Second, our semi-static transformation works only when n = poly(λ), since the time complexities of the security reductions are at least linear in n. For identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE), where n may be exponential in λ, we use a different approach.
To solve these problems we use techniques from the Gentry IBE system [18] . We begin by building an "initial" identity-based broadcast encryption system with core component of size O(λ) plus an additional "tag" of size O(λ · |S|). The tag represents a random polynomial in Z p . The public key is of size O( · λ) for when we can broadcast to at most users.
While a system with ciphertexts of size O(λ · |S|) is not immediately useful, we can build on this in several ways.
-First, we show that for standard (non-identity-based) broadcast systems we can omit the tag and achieve O(λ) size ciphertexts and private keys while retaining semi-static security. -Second, we show how in the random oracle model the tag can be generated from a short O(λ) size seed and get adaptively secure ID-based broadcast encryption with O(λ) size ciphertexts. -Finally, in the standard model we show how to achieve ID-based encryption with O(λ · |S|) size ciphertexts. In this approach we essentially perform |S| encryptions to |S| of the recipients, but share one tag polynomial across all these encryptions.
We prove the security of this base scheme and its derivatives under a new non-interactive assumption.
Related Work
Dodis and Fazio [16] showed how to build an adaptively secure revocation system building upon the techniques of Cramer and Shoup [12] and Naor and Pinkas [23] . In their system the ciphertext size is O(λ · |R|), where R is the set of revoked users.
Delerablée, Paillier, and Pointcheval [14] describe a system that is somewhat incomparable to ours and the others discussed here; it allows the adversary to wait until just before each dynamic join operation to declare whether it is joining as an honest or corrupt party (the challenge broadcast is for the honest parties), but then each join operation triggers a change to the public key.
The concept of identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) was proposed in [13] (and independently in [27] ). This concept is related to identity-based encryption [25] , in which the maximal size of a broadcast group is = 1. It is also related to multi receiver ID-based KEM (mID-KEM), introduced in [26] and further developed in [4, 5, 11, 2] . We also note that Panjwani [1] considered adaptive corruptions, but in the context of stateful protocols such as Logical Key Hierarchy.
Adaptive Security in Broadcast Encryption
We present background material on broadcast encryption systems. Then we show our main transformation; we describe how to build adaptive securely broadcast encryption systems from those that are secure against a "semi-static" adversary.
Broadcast Encryption Systems
We begin by formally defining the notion of security for a public-key broadcast encryption system. For simplicity we define broadcast encryption as a key encapsulation mechanism. In addition, we make our definition general enough to capture identity-based encryption systems.
A broadcast encryption system is made up of four randomized algorithms:
Setup(n, ) Takes as input the number of receivers n and the maximal size ≤ n of a broadcast recipient group. It outputs a public/secret key pair P K, SK .
(We leave another input, the input security parameter λ, implicit.) KeyGen(i, SK) Takes as input an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and the secret key SK.
It outputs a private key d i . Enc(S, P K) Takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a public key P K. If |S| ≤ , it outputs a pair Hdr, K where Hdr is called the header and K ∈ K is a message encryption key. Let E sym be a symmetric encryption scheme with key-space K, and algorithms SymEnc and SymDec. Let M be a message to be broadcast to the set S, and let C M R ← SymEnc(K, M ) be the encryption of M under the symmetric key K. The broadcast to users in S consists of S, Hdr, C M . Dec(S, i, d i , Hdr, P K) Takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a private key d i for i, a header Hdr, and the public key P K. If |S| ≤ and i ∈ S, then the algorithm outputs the message encryption key K ∈ K. The key K can then be used to decrypt C M to obtain M .
As usual, we require that the system be correct, namely, that for all S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} ≤ and all i ∈ S, if P K, SK
Our goal is to illustrate the issues for adaptive security. For simplicity, we define security against chosen plaintext attacks. However, our definitions can readily be extended to reflect chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Security Definitions
Arguably, the "correct" definition for security in broadcast encryption systems is that of adaptive security. In an adaptively secure system, the adversary is allowed to see P K and then ask for several private keys before choosing the set of indices that it wishes to attack.
Adaptive security in broadcast encryption is defined using the following game between an attack algorithm A and a challenger. Both the challenger and A are given n and as input.
Setup. The challenger runs Setup(n, ) to obtain a public key P K, which it gives to the adversary. Key Query Phase. Algorithm A adaptively issues private key queries for indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Challenge. The adversary then specifies a challenge set S * , such that for all private keys i queried we have that i / ∈ S * . The challenger sets Hdr We define A's advantage in attacking the broadcast encryption system BE with parameters (n, ) and security parameter λ as
We may omit the system name when it can be understood from the context.
Definition 1.
We say that a broadcast encryption system BE is adaptively secure if for all poly-time algorithms A we have that AdvBr A,BE,n, (λ) = negl(λ).
In addition to the adaptive game for broadcast security, we consider two other weaker security notions. The first is static security, where the adversary must commit to the set S * of identities that it will attack in an "Init" phase before the setup algorithm is run. This is the security definition that is used by recent broadcast encryption systems [8] .
We also propose a new security definition called semi-static security. In this game the adversary must commit to a setS of indices at the Init phase. The adversary cannot query a private key for any i ∈S, and it must choose a target group S * for the challenge ciphertext that is a subset ofS. A semi-static adversary is weaker than an adaptive adversary, but it is stronger than a static adversary, in that its choice of which subset ofS to attack can be adaptive.
Transforming Semi-Static Security to Adaptive Security
At first the benefits of achieving semi-static security versus just static security might appear incremental. Indeed, in both games, the adversary is forced to restrict its queries before it even sees the public key.
Despite this apparent shortcoming, we will show that the semi-static security definition is a very useful tool for achieving adaptive security. We will show how to transform any semi-static broadcast encryption scheme to one secure under adaptive attacks with a modest increase in overhead.
Our main idea is to apply a simulation for a two-key technique. In such a system each user will be associated with two potential private keys; however, the authority will give it only one of the two. An encryptor (that does not know which private key the receiver possesses) will need to encrypt the ciphertext twice, once for each key. This technique was used by Katz and Wang [21] to create tightly secure signature and identity-based encryption systems in the random oracle model.
The main benefit is that a simulator will have the private keys for every identity. In the Katz-Wang constructions this enabled tight security reductions. In the context of broadcast encryption, the impact will be much stronger, since trying to guess S * would otherwise result in an exponential loss of security in the reduction. We now show how to apply the two-key idea to broadcast encryption.
Suppose we are given a semi-static secure broadcast system BE SS with algorithms Setup SS , KeyGen SS , Enc SS , Dec SS . Then we can build our adaptively secure broadcast system BE A as follows. Set S 0 and S 1 as above. Run
Note that, aside from the string t, the BE A ciphertext is only about twice as long as a BE SS ciphertext. Suppose that we have a semi-static broadcast encryption system in which ciphertexts are "constant-size" -i.e., O(λ) for security parameter λ. Then, our transformation gives an adaptively secure broadcast encryption system with ciphertexts that are O(λ + |S|), versus O(λ · |S|). In particular, the ciphertext size in BE A increases by only one bit per additional recipient. Later, we will describe a semi-static broadcast encryption system in which Hdr contains only two group elements of, say, 200 bits apiece -a total of 400 bits. As an example, suppose we apply the transformation above to this scheme to encrypt to 1000 users, and use AES for the symmetric system. In this case, the Hdr size of the induced adaptively-secure broadcast encryption system is 2 · 400 + 2 · 128 + 1000 = 2056 bits, versus say 400 · 1000 = 400000 bits.
It is easy to see that, assuming BE A is adaptively secure, we can get adaptively secure broadcast encryption system with truly constant-size O(λ) ciphertexts in the random oracle model as follows. Put a hash function H : {0, 1} O(λ) × {1, . . . , n} → {0, 1} in the public key. The sender encrypts as before, except that it generates t by setting u R ← {0, 1} O(λ) and t i ← H(u, i); it replaces t by u in the ciphertext. The recipient decrypts as before, except that it recovers t from u using H.
Alternatively, without random oracles, we get an adaptively secure broadcast encryption system with O( λ · |S|) size ciphertexts from a semi-static system with O(λ) size ciphertexts by partitioning the |S| users into |S|/λ groups of λ · |S| users, and then re-using the same λ · |S|-bit string t for every group. Asymptotically, this beats the adaptively-secure system of [10] , but often the system above with O(λ + |S|) size ciphertexts will still be preferable in practice. Security follows from the security of the underlying semi-static system by a hybrid argument (omitted).
We now show that BE A is secure if BE SS is secure. 
Proof. We present the proof as a sequence of games. Let W i denote the event that A wins game i.
Game 0. The first game is identical to the adaptive security game given above. Thus,
Game 1. Game 1 is identical to Game 0, except that the challenger generates C 0 in the challenge ciphertext as follows: set κ † 0
We claim that there exists an algorithm B 1 , whose running time is about the same as A, such that
To break BE SS , B 1 sets s
. . , n}}. It sendsS to the challenger, which sends back P K . B sets P K ← P K and forwards P K to A.
When A queries the BE A private key for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, B queries the challenger for the BE SS private key for 2i − s i . The challenger sends back
A requests a challenge ciphertext on some If b = 0, A's view is as in Game 0. The private keys sent by B are appropriately distributed. The string t appears to be uniformly random, since A's private key queries reveal only the values of s i for i / ∈ S * . Also, κ
0 is generated correctly, and so the dependent values are as well. If b = 1, A's view is as in Game 1. The claim follows. Game 2. Game 2 is identical to Game 1, except that the challenger sets κ 1 R ← K when constructing the challenge ciphertext. By an analysis similar to above, we conclude that there exists an algorithm B 2 , which runs in about the same time as A, for which
Game 3. Game 3 is identical to Game 2, except that the challenger sets K † 0
. We claim that there exists an algorithm B 3 , which runs in about the same time as A, for which
This follows, since it is straightforward to construct B 3 as an algorithm that attacks the semantic security of E sym .
Game 4. Game 4 is identical to Game 3, except that the challenger sets K † 1
. As above, we obtain
Finally, the theorem follows if the following claim is true:
This claim follows since, in Game 4, Hdr is independent of K b , and hence b.
BE Construction with Small Ciphertexts
Now that we have our transformation of semi-static security to adaptive security, we would like to leverage it to create new adaptively secure broadcast encryption systems. One obvious candidate to examine is the Boneh-Gentry-Waters [8] broadcast encryption system. Unfortunately, it was proven only to be statically secure and there does not appear to be an obvious way to make the proof semistatic.
3
To prove semi-static security we will need to use a variant of the BGW system. We first describe our construction. Then we describe the decisional-BDHE assumption (the same one used by BGW). Then we prove our system to be semi-statically secure under this assumption.
Our Construction
Let GroupGen(λ, n) be an algorithm that, on input security parameter λ, generates groups G and G T of prime order p = p(λ, n) > n with bilinear map
The secret key is SK ← g α . Output P K, SK
The BGW reduction depends upon an exact cancellation between a value embedded by the simulator in the parameters and a function of the target set S * .
Enc(S, P K): Set t R ← Z p and parse d i as d i,0 , . . . , d i,n and Hdr as C 1 , C 2 and output
Correctness: We check that decryption recovers the correct value of K.
= e(g, g)
α·t as required.
The BDHE Assumption
We base the security of the above system on the decision BDHE assumption, used in [8] . The decision BDHE problem is as follows. (for m)) . Let G and G T be groups of order p with bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and let g be a generator for G. The problem is to guess b.
Definition 2 (Decision BDHE problem
We define AdvBDHE A,m (λ) in the expected way. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let A be a semi-static adversary against the above system. Then, there is an algorithm B, which runs in about the same time as A, such that
We provide the proof in Appendix A.
Semi-Static BE with Small Ciphertexts and Private Keys
In the semi-static system described in Section 3, the public key and private keys are of size O(λ · n). However, we have an alternative construction that has a public key of size O(λ · ) and constant-sized private keys (i.e., O(λ)). This construction is a special case of the identity-based broadcast encryption system that we provide in Section 4.1. We provide more details in Section 4.3.
Identity-Based BE with Small Ciphertexts and Private Keys
The essential property of an identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) system is that it remains efficient when n is exponential in the security parameter λ. Adaptive security is even more challenging in this setting. In particular, our semi-static constructions do not give adaptively secure IBBE, since the time complexities of the reduction algorithms are at least linear in n.
Here we first describe an initial IBBE system with adaptive security, where the ciphertext size is constant aside from a random "tag" that has length O(λ · |S|). This long tag is needed by the simulator to handle the fact that the adversary chooses the target set S * adaptively. The public key has size O(λ · ), and private keys are constant size (i.e., O(λ)). This system is an extension of Gentry's IBE system [18] .
At first, a system with such a long tag appears to be pointless. However, there are several ways to address this apparent problem. First, for polynomial-size n, we show that the system is semi-statically secure if we replace the random tag with a constant tag; the ciphertext size then becomes constant. Second, we make the straightforward observation that, in the random oracle model, we obtain an adaptively secure IBBE system with constant-size ciphertexts if we generate the tag from the random oracle. Finally, we construct an adaptively secure IBBE system (in the standard model) that, for a recipient group of size k ≤ , has O(λ · √ k)-size ciphertexts, a O(λ · √ )-size public key, and still constant-size private keys, by reusing the same O(λ · √ k)-size tag in O( √ k) separate sub ciphertexts from the initial system. As far as we know, this is the first IBBE system with sub-linear ciphertexts secure against adaptive adversaries.
An Initial IBBE Construction
Let GroupGen(λ, n, ) be an algorithm that outputs suitable bilinear group parameters G, G T , e , where G is of order p ≥ n + .
Generate a random key κ for a PRF Ψ : [1, n] → Z p . The private key is SK ← (α, γ, κ). KeyGen(i, SK): Similar to Gentry's IBE system, set r i ← Ψ κ (i) and output the private key
Note that τ can be expressed by k values in Z p -e.g., {F (i) : i ∈ S}; F (x) can be interpolated from these values and {F (n + j) = 1 : j ∈ [k + 1, ]}. TagEncrypt(τ, S, P K): Parse τ as F (x) and S as {i 1 , . . . , i k }.
, and Hdr as C 1 , . . . , C 4 . Define P (x) as above. Let
, and
Note that the recipient can compute g
from P K, since F i (x) and P i (x) are polynomials of degree − 2. Correctness: We verify that decryption recovers the message. First, we note that K = K 1 · K 2 , where we gather the terms containing a γ in K 1 , and the other terms in
We have that
We also have that
as required.
Security of the Initial IBBE Construction
Below, we define a class of assumptions that is narrower than the general bilinear DH exponent "uber-assumption" defined by Boneh et al. [6] , but broad enough to cover some frequently used assumptions. One reason that we think carving out this class of assumptions is useful is that it is much easier to glance at an assumption in this class and verify that it at least superficially makes sense than it is for some of the wilder assumptions within general BDHE.
Definition 3 (The Decision BDHE Sum Problem for (S, m)). Fix S ⊂ Z and m ∈ Z \ (S + S). Let G and G T be groups of order p with bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and let g be a generator for G. Set α
The problem is to guess b.
In the decision n-BDHI problem, S = [0, n] and m = −1. One can reduce the Decision BDHE Sum problem for S = [0, n] ∪ [n + 2, 2n] ∪ [3n] and m = 4n + 1 to the decision BDHE problem for n -i.e., s in the BDHE problem is replaced by α 3n . Although we do not use it in this paper, we mention an obvious (possibly easier) variant of the problem:
Definition 4 (The Decision BDHE Sum Problem for (S, m) (variant)). As above, except Z is replaced in the instance by random (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ G 2 satisfying e(z 1 , z 2 ) = Z.
A recent paper [3] builds the first adaptively secure hierarchical identity based encryption (HIBE) system that allows a polynomial number of levels by building on our IBBE system and using this variant of the Decision BDHE Sum problem.
We base the security of our system on the Decision BDHE Sum problem for m = 4d + 4 − 1 and
where d = q + 2 , q and non-negative. We define AdvBDHES A,q, (λ) in the expected way, using these particular values of S and m. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let A be an adaptive adversary against the above initial IBBE system that makes at mostueries. Then, there exist algorithms B 1 and B 2 such that
where B 1 runs in about the same time as A, and B 2 runs in time t(A) + O((q + ) 2 · λ 3 ), assuming exponentiations take time O(λ 3 ).
We provide the proof in Appendix B.
Variants of the IBBE Construction
Semi-Static BE with Constant-Size Ciphertexts and Private Keys When n = poly(λ), we obtain a semi-statically secure variant of the above system with constant-size ciphertexts by making the following simple change.
Since τ is always 1, we do not need to include it in the ciphertext. Also, some terms in P K become unnecessary -in particular, {g
We have the following theorem. Let q = n. Theorem 4. Let A be a semi-static adversary against the above system. Then, there exist algorithms B 1 and B 2 such that
where B 1 runs in about the same time as A and B 2 runs in time
We prove this simultaneously with Theorem 3 in Appendix B.
Adaptively Secure IBBE with Constant-Size Ciphertexts in the ROM In the random oracle model, the obvious way to modify the initial IBBE system to obtain constant-size ciphertexts is to generate τ using a hash function H :
In particular, we make the following modification.
In TagEncrypt and Dec, F (x) is set to be the ( − 1)-degree polynomial that interpolates F (i) = H(τ, i) for i ∈ S and F (i) = 1 for i ∈ [n+j] with j ∈ [k+1, ]. The ciphertext size is constant, since the size of τ is constant (i.e., O(λ)). We omit the easy tight reduction from an adversary that breaks the initial system to an adversary that breaks this system.
Adaptively Secure IBBE with Sublinear-Size Ciphertexts Let = 1 · 2 . Below, we describe a system that builds on the initial IBBE system and allows one to encrypt to a set S with 
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let A be an adaptive adversary against this system that makes at mostueries. Then, there exist algorithms B 1 and B 2 , the former being an adversary against the initial IBBE system that makes at mostueries, each algorithm running in about the same time as A, such that
As before E sym is a symmetric encryption scheme. We omit the proof, since it is a simple hybrid argument similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
It is easy to handle the case where |S| cannot be expressed as a product k 1 ·k 2 with k 1 , k 2 = O( |S|). Let S consist of the first k 1 · k 2 identities in S, where
|S| . Encrypt to S using the above system, and to S \ S using any reasonable system -e.g., the initial system. The overall size of the ciphertext is still O(λ · |S|). One can prove the security of this double encryption by a sequence of games similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Init A commits to a setS ⊆ [1, n] .
Formally, B sets α ← y 0 · a n+1 . It sets P K to include a description of G, G T , e , as well as g , e(g, g) α , h 1 , . . . , h n where e(g, g) α can be computed as e(g a , g a n ) y0 . B sends P K to A.
Private Key Queries A is allowed to query the private key only for indices i ∈ [1, n] \S. To answer the query, B generates z i R ← Z p and formally sets r i ← z i − y 0 · a n+1−i . It outputs
Notice that B can compute all these terms from the instance; in particular
which can be computed since the a n+1 term in the exponent cancels out.
Challenge A chooses a subset S * ⊂S. B sets Hdr ← C 1 , C 2 where
It sets K ← Z y0 . It sends Hdr, K to A. Notice that B can compute these terms from the instance. C 1 and K come directly from the instance. B can compute C 2 since it knows DL g (h i ) for all i ∈ S * ; in particular,
Guess Eventually, A outputs a bit b . B sends b to the challenger.
Perfect Simulation From A's perspective, B's simulation has exactly the same distribution as the semi-static game defined in Section 2.2. The public and private keys are appropriately distributed, since α and the values {DL g (h i )} and {r i } are uniformly random and independent. When b = 0 in the semi-static game, Hdr, K is generated according to the same distribution as in the real world. This is also true in B's simulation: when b = 0, K = e(g, g)
α·s , and so the challenge is valid ciphertext under randomness s. When b = 1 in the semi-static game, Hdr, K is generated as in the real world, but K is replaced by K R ← K, and Hdr, K is sent to the adversary. This distribution is identical to that of B's simulation, where Hdr is valid for randomness s, but K = Z is a uniformly random element of G T .
From this, we see that B's advantage in deciding the BDHE instance is precisely A's advantage against BE SS .
B Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
First, a lemma. Let p(x)q(x)|i denote the coefficient of x i in p(x)q(x). Proof. (Theorems 3 and 4) This is given in the full version.
